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Article 6

COMMENTARY

GERMAN PENSION REFORM*
FriedrichKidbler*
It is a great pleasure to be back at Brooklyn Law School,
and it has been no less of a pleasure to listen to the excellent
paper presented by Professor Lothar Schruff. As I agree with
everything he has said, there is no reason to respond. All I
want to do is to add two observations to the need for, and the
problems of, reform in Germany.
First, the aspirations for serious reform have to be seen in
the larger context of changes in basic economic and social
structures in Germany. This can be best explained by referring
to the very interesting phenomenon of the direct pension
commitment made by a firm to its employee. This has been an
important element of industrial recovery since World War II.
First of all, it was a wonderful instrument of corporate finance.
As wages were low, it can be said that part of employees'
earnings were kept within the firm and paid out only after
retirement. They constituted funds which could be used for
self-financing. On the balance sheet they were liabilities;
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therefore, they were subject neither to taxation nor to
shareholders' claims for dividends. It was long term debt used
by management to rebuild German industry.
At the same time, the pension commitment provided
incentives to form human capital within the firm. Workers
stayed until retirement; they were interested in the future of
the enterprise and dedicated to their jobs. It was worthwhile
to spend resources on their education.
More recently, and for a number of reasons, this system
has come under considerable stress. Wages are no longer low
in Germany so the pension commitment is a liability which
adds to the price of labor-which is among the highest globally.
Since we see more bankruptcies, it has become obvious that
the system of direct pensions has shifted additional insolvency
risks to employees. They lose not only their jobs but also their
pensions. For this reason, the insurance system, which has
been explained by Professor Schruff, has been introduced. With
the recession, however, corporate failures have increased;
therefore, premiums have gone up and become a burden for
corporate firms.
In addition, while employees' interest in the firm may
have declined with the insurance system, at the same time
there is more mobility among workers. For these reasons
human capital is no longer served by the system. Finally,
corporate finance has changed. The German department
market has recovered, the equity market is slowly improving,
and German corporations have access to the internationalized
financial markets. Thus, self-financing is no longer needed;
and it is no longer thought to be an efficient method to provide
funds for investment.
Now to my second observation. I think the obvious way to
proceed for Germany is to move towards defined contribution
pension funds similar to American or U.K. style. The big
problem for the moment, however, appears to be tax. The
general rule in Germany is that you are taxed for your income
even if you invest it individually in order to secure your post
retirement income. But there is one important exception-life
insurance. To a certain amount, life insurance premiums can
be deducted from taxation; even the later payment by the
insurance company enjoys some tax benefits. It is generally
assumed that pension funds will not be sufficiently attractive if
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they are not allowed to enjoy comparable tax advantages. That
is to say: the tax benefits of life insurance should be extended
to pension funds.
This proposition is a source of conflict between the
insurance and the banking business. The insurance companies
want to run the pension funds as benefit defined funds, and
they argue that tax advantages should be extended only to
their funds. The banks plan to offer contribution defined funds,
and they argue that the tax benefits should be equally granted
to those programs. In addition, Germany faces considerable
budget problems. We experienced difficulties meeting the
standards for monetary union in Europe. It is generally
assumed that we need a tax reform in order to meet the
challenges of global competition. However, lower rates of
individual and of corporate income tax will not be possible
without cutting back on government expenses, including tax
subsidies. So there exist two conflicting policy objectives. For
the moment, I do not see how this will be resolved. The
outcome of the federal election in ten days may have an
impact, but neither side has clearly indicated so far what they
will or would do.

